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Monday, May 23, 2022

 

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Ninth Circuit Opinion Does Not Justify City’s Deviation From Statute, C.A. Declares

Segal Says California Supreme Court’s Validation of Statute Is Controlling

Although Federal Decision Overturning It Relied on a Different Aspect

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

The City of Los Angeles must adhere to a statute requiring that where a citizen files a complaint against a law enforcement officer, a signature must be obtained on a form stating awareness that making such a complaint, if false, is a misdemeanor, the Court of Appeal for this district has held, rejecting the city’s contention that, under unique circumstances, a 2002 California Supreme Court decision upholding the statute should be ignored.

Three years after the state high court in People v. Stanistreet found that Penal Code §148.6 does not intrude upon a complaining party’s First Amendment rights, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Chaker v. Crogan that the statute does violate such rights.

In particular, §148.6 mandates that the complainant’s signature be secured on a form that says:

“IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED ON A MISDEMEANOR CHARGE.

“I have read and understood the above statement.”

Justice John L. Segal of Div. Seven authored Thursday’s opinion affirming a judgment by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert B. Broadbelt III granting injunctive relief sought by the Los Angeles Police Protective League to force compliance with the statute by the city’s police department. The opinion spurns the contention by the Office of City Attorney that the appeals court is at liberty to follow the Ninth Circuit opinion, not that of the state high court, because the two courts examined different aspects of the First Amendment.

Action Against City

The city’s noncompliance with §148.6 stems from a lawsuit the U.S. government brought against the city prior to the decisions in Stanistreet and Chaker. In 2000, the government alleged in a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California that the city engages in a pattern of practices violative of civil rights.

The city entered into a consent decree, one provision of which was that it would not enforce §148.6; the decree expired in 2013; the city continued to ignore the statutory dictate; the police union brought suit in 2017 against the department and the police chief; Broadbelt granted an injunction.

On appeal, the city argued that in Stanistreet, §148.6 was held to withstand a First Amendment challenge based on a content-based speech restriction, while in Chaker, the statute was held to impose a constitutionally impermissible viewpoint-based speech restriction. That, under the city’s view, meant that California courts of appeal may follow Chaker without defying a decision of the state’s highest court.

Segal observed:

“The City correctly points out that the arguments the California Supreme Court rejected in Stanistreet are not entirely identical to the arguments the Ninth Circuit accepted in Chaker. The City also argues the injunction requires the City to enforce a statute federal courts have found is unconstitutional. That’s a real problem.”

Supreme Court Decision

The state Supreme Court’s majority decision in Stanistreet, written by then-Justice Ming Chin (now retired), said that §148.6 “proscribes only constitutionally unprotected speech—knowingly false statements of fact” and applies only to formal complaints, the filing of which “legally obligates the agency to investigate the complaint.”

He declared:

“The circumstance that it covers only those persons—peace officers who will be the subject of the mandatory investigation does not render it unconstitutional.”

In Chaker, Circuit Judge Harry Pregerson (now deceased) wrote:

“[A] formal complaint of peace officer misconduct triggers a mandatory investigation conducted by the peace officer’s employing agency. Within the limited context of that investigation, section 148.6 criminalizes knowingly false speech critical of peace officer conduct, but leaves unregulated knowingly false speech supportive of peace officer conduct.”

Pregerson wrote:

“[W]e conclude that the statute impermissibly discriminates on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment….”

Segal’s Opinion

Segal provided this discussion:

“The City argues that, because ‘Stanistreet and Chaker considered very different content-based distinctions,’ and ‘[b]ecause an opinion has no authority regarding an issue it did not address,’ we can follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Chaker rather than the California Supreme Court’s holding in Stanistreet. We cannot.”

He explained:

“Although the specific arguments the California Supreme Court rejected in Stanistreet are somewhat different from those the City advances here, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stanistreet applies. That’s enough to control our decision here.”

Potential Events

Segal went on to say:

“Unless and until the California Supreme Court reconsiders its decision in Stanistreet (or the United States Supreme Court considers the constitutionality of section 148.6 or an analogous statute), we may not decide section 148.6 constitutes an impermissible restriction on content-based or viewpoint-based speech.

“Which leaves the City in a practical quandary: The City must either disobey a state court injunction or enforce a statute federal courts have held is unconstitutional and cannot be enforced. The City currently has a temporary reprieve from this dilemma because the trial court stayed the injunction until this court issues its remittitur [on July 19], which will not occur until the Supreme Court rules on a petition for review, if one is filed (or after the time to file such a petition expires). In the absence of intervention by the California Supreme Court (or the United States Supreme Court), the stay will expire, and the injunction will take effect.”

Presiding Justice Dennis M. Perluss signed Segal’s opinion but added some thoughts in a concurring opinion, noting certain matters that remain unsettled.

The case is Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, 2022 S.O.S. 2187.

 

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