Metropolitan News-Enterprise

 

Tuesday, August 23, 2021

 

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Unreasonable Mistake of Fact Negates Criminality—S.C.

Erroneous Instruction That Defendant Must Have ‘Reasonably’ Believed That Home He Tried to Break Into Was

His Cousin’s Requires Reversal of Burglary Conviction; Rejects C.A. Majority’s View of Facial Fabrication

 

By a MetNews Staff Writer

 

A man who went into the backyard of a home, tried unsuccessfully to break in, and was sitting on a bench when police encountered him, might actually have thought, as he claimed, that the house belonged to his cousin, the California Supreme Court held yesterday in a unanimous decision, criticizing the Court of Appeal’s majority for usurping the function of a jury by factually finding that the account lacked credibility.

Justice Leondra Kruger authored the high court opinion. It reverses the decision rendered on Oct. 19, 2020, by this district’s Div. Six.

Acting Presiding Justice Kenneth Yegan wrote for Div. Six’s majority in saying that Ventura Superior Court Judge Paul W. Baelly erred in instructing jurors that a mistake of fact on the part of defendant Isaiah Hendrix had to be “reasonable” to exonerate him on a charge of first-decree burglary, but that the instructional error was harmless because the defendant’s tale was implausible.

Justice Steven Z. Perren joined in that opinion, and then-Justice Martin J. Tangeman (who has returned to law practice) dissented.

Yegan’s Opinion

Yegan wrote:

 “We must observe that the story appellant told the police was a fabrication. No cousin who wanted to visit a relative would make multiple forcible attempts to enter the house and a garage. This is the method of operation for a residential burglar. It is not the method of operation for a family visit. It must be emphasized that appellant did not testify that he subjectively believed cousin Trevor lived at the scene of the burglary. He did not call as a witness the person who allegedly told him that cousin Trevor moved to the house. His name is unknown. His description is unknown. His whereabouts are unknown. There is a disconnect here.”

He added:

“Even if appellant subjectively believed that cousin Trevor lived at the house, that did not give him the right to attempt entry, multiple times, by force. Would a person who subjectively believes that a cousin lives at a residence also think that the cousin would allow forcible entry for a social visit?”

Hendrix, in a recorded telephone conversation with his mother while he was in jail, beseeched her to find someone to lie that he had provided advice that the cousin resided at the house, Yegan noted.

Tangeman protested:

“[T]he majority substitutes its own judgment, based on a cold record, about appellant’s credibility and true intentions. Given appellant’s recent mental health history and inexplicable conduct on the day in question. I cannot in good conscience conclude that no reasonable juror might have reached a different result if properly instructed.”

Supreme Court Decision

Kruger declared:

“The jury was instructed, if not in so many words, that burglary is a specific intent crime, so it should have received a specific intent mistake of fact instruction that recognized the possibility that a genuine, if unreasonable, belief would negate a finding of criminal intent.”

It is undisputed, she noted, that the reference in the instruction to “reasonable” was error, because a genuine but unreasonable belief that the home was that of Hendrix’s cousin Trevor would have negated the mens rea element.

“The potential effect of the error was considerable in this case, where Hendrix’s mistake of fact claim was the central disputed issue at trial,” Kruger said, concluding that the error was not harmless. She commented:

“Although the main issue at trial was whether Hendrix genuinely believed that Trevor lived at the house—and not specifically whether Hendrix’s belief was reasonable—a juror viewing all the evidence would naturally have considered the possibility that Hendrix was neither intentionally lying nor harboring a reasonable belief, but was instead unreasonably (though honestly) mistaken about where his cousin really lived.”

Yegan’s Approach

Disagreeing with Yegan’s approach, Kruger remarked:

“The Court of Appeal’s analysis amounted, in sum, to a determination that Hendrix’s story was false because it was unreasonable, convenient, and because the limited evidence supporting it was outweighed by other evidence. But the law recognizes unreasonable mistakes as negating the specific intent required for burglary; a defendant’s factual claim is not false merely because it helps his case; and although the proof of Hendrix’s belief may have been limited, it was nonetheless sufficiently substantial to raise a genuinely contested issue. The overall effect of the Court of Appeal’s approach was to substitute the court’s judgment for that of Hendrix’s jury regarding the central question in the case: what Hendrix really believed when he approached the Oxnard house. It may well be that a properly instructed jury would have agreed with the Court of Appeal’s assessment of the evidence. But it was the jury’s assessment, not the Court of Appeal’s, to make.”

The case is People v. Hendrix, 2022 S.O.S. 3970.

 

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