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Court of Appeal:
Recreational Immunity Bars Suit by Jogger
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Court of Appeal for this district has affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the owner of real property on which the plaintiff had been jogging at about midnight, rejecting her contention that it was negligent, and that premises liability exists, because a homeless encampment was present, causing her to avoid it by going into the bike lane where she was struck by an automobile, sustaining severe injuries.
Plaintiff Shanna Rucker insisted in her complaint that defendant WINCAL LLC “negligently, carelessly, recklessly, and unlawfully owned, managed, maintained, controlled, and inspected” its premises on Winnetka Avenue (a block from the Chatsworth Courthouse).
Justice Dorothy Kim of Div. Five wrote the opinion, filed Friday. Kim agreed with Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Daniel M. Crowley who ruled on July 17, 2020, that recreational immunity applies.
Crowley relied on Civil Code §846(a) which provides:
“An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property...owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions, uses of. structures, or activities on those premises to persons entering for a recreational purpose, except as provided in this section.”
Subd. (b) of the statute lists “hiking” as an example of a recreational purpose.
Crowley said, in granting summary judgment:
“The Court finds Moving Party has met its burden showing Plaintiffs jogging was for a recreational purpose….Webster’s defines ‘jog’ as ‘to run or ride at a slow trot’ or ‘to go at a slow, leisurely, or monotonous pace.’ It necessarily follows that Plaintiff’s jogging was a leisurely run, which falls within the recreational use statute when that statute is construed broadly….As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff.
“Plaintiff has not met her burden. Plaintiff merely argues that ‘jogging’ is not within the list of recreational activities in California Civil Code section 846, subdivision (b) and it is question of fact for the jury to determine if Plaintiff’s jogging was ‘hiking’ as used within the statute….[T]his list is non-exhaustive and is to be construed broadly. Jogging is more akin to hiking as it is movement that has a leisurely component to it, unlike merely walking. Accordingly, summary judgment is properly granted on this ground.”
Kim wrote:
“Jogging to train for a foot race is an activity in which one engages for a ‘recreational purpose’ under section 846; and a property owner generally owes no duty of care to those who enter or use its property for such an activity.”
On Sept. 2, 2020, Crowley granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles. Rucker sought to hold it to blame based on inadequate lighting. The judge found:
“Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that had the homeless camp been illuminated, she would not have run into the street. Nor has plaintiff submitted any evidence that had the homeless camp been illuminated, the driver who hit her would not have hit her.”
Litigation in the case continues with the driver of the car that hit Rucker and its owner as parties.
The case is Rucker v. WINCAL, LLC, 2022 S.O.S. 547.
Pasadena attorney James S. Link and Studio City lawyer Daniel Andrew Gibalevich represented Rucker. Eric Arevalo, Jeffrey P. Cunningham and David P. Reid of the Costa Mesa firm of Schumann Rosenberg & Arevalo acted for WINCAL LLC.
Copyright 2022, Metropolitan News Company