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Ninth Circuit:

21-Month Pre-Trial Detention Justified by Pandemic

By a MetNews Staff Writer

A man whose criminal trial has been put off because of the COVID-19 pandemic and has been in custody since Aug. 26, 2019, when the usual maximum period of pretrial detention is 90 days, has not been denied a statutory right, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held on Friday, nor has he been denied due process, a three-judge panel said, but observed that it’s approaching that point.

The decision came in an opinion by Circuit Judge Mary H. Murguia. It affirms a determination by District Court Judge Christina A. Snyder of the Central District of California that the 2019 order of a magistrate judge that defendant Paul Francisco Torres III be held in custody pending trial is to remain in effect.

He is charged with possession with intent to distribute approximately 46 grams of methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of ammunition, with several priors. His trial, which has been repeatedly postponed, is now set for May 25.

“Torres asks us to determine whether the Speedy Trial Act or the Due Process Clause require his release, or in his words, ‘prohibit Torres’s lengthy, ongoing, and indefinite detention,’ ” Murguia recited.

‘Ends of Justice’

Her answer to the statutory claim was that the Speedy Trial Act contains an “ends-of-justice” provision in §3161. It excludes from the time within which a trial must commence “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance...if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”

Murguia said delays excluded under that provision are necessarily also excluded under §3164 “when calculating the ninety-day detention clock.”

In determining whether the ends of justice are served by a delay, she noted, the defendant’s status as being in detention or not is necessarily taken into account.

‘Trivial’ Benefit

Torres argued that his prolonged pre-trial confinement confers on the government a “trivial” benefit and leads to an absurd result. Murguia responded:

“The government acknowledges that § 3164 ‘may be largely vestigial and rarely invoked,’ but a trivial benefit is still a benefit and the absurdity canon is an extremely high bar….Our interpretation of § 3164 does not lead to absurd results.”

She acknowledged that if his trial does begin next month, he will have been confined for 21 months. However, the jurist said:

“When proper tolling is considered, Torres has not yet been in pretrial detention for a period longer than ninety days. The Speedy Trial Act. therefore, does not require Torres to be released at this time.”

Due Process

Addressing the due-process concern, Murguia pointed to the defendant’s criminal record and said:

“On balance, we conclude that Torres’ twenty-one-month detention does not yet violate due process, but we caution that the length of Torres’s detention is approaching the limits of what due process can tolerate. The length of Torres’s pretrial detention is significant under any metric and is deeply troubling. But the lack of any prosecutorial contribution to the delay and the strength of the evidence supporting Torres’s detention lead us to conclude that Torres’s detention is rationally connected to a regulatory purpose—preventing danger to the community and ensuring Torres will appear as required.”

She added:

“Because of the troubling length of Torres’s pretrial detention, due process demands that the district court begin Torres’s trial or reconsider bail subject to appropriate conditions very soon.”

The case is United States v. Torres, 21-50006.