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Ninth Circuit:
ID Procedures Validated in 1999 Can’t Be Re-Determined
Majority Says Man Convicted of Rape, Exonerated by DNA Evidence, Bound by Findings at Superior Court Trial
By a MetNews Staff Writer
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held yesterday, in a 2-1 decision, that a District Court judge made the right call in barring a man who was exonerated of one rape and two attempted rapes after spending 16 years in prison was barred from litigating, in a civil rights action, the identification procedure by police because that issue was resolved at his 1999 trial in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
The ruling came in an appeal by Luis Lorenzo Vargas, who had been dubbed the “Teardop Rapist” in news accounts based on a tattoo of a teardrop by an eye. He was convicted on June 15, 1999; the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for this district on June 26 2000; and on Nov. 23, 2015, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge William C. Ryan granted a writ of habeas corpus based on DNA evidence exonerating him of the rape.
Circuit Judge Lawrence VanDyke wrote for the majority in finding that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the identification issue. Joining in the opinion (and also penning a concurring opinion) was District Court Judge Edward R. Korman of the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Circuit Judge Richard Paez dissented on the issue, but joined in other aspects of VanDyke’s opinion which upheld various rulings by District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central District of California in favor of Los Angeles police officers, but reversed his dismissal of claims of municipal liability, saying that matter must be redetermined on remand using the correct standards.
Burden on System
In addressing the claim based on improper identification preocedures, Paez said:
“[A]llowing Vargas to litigate this claim in a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not a significant burden on the judicial system.”
VanDyke responded:
“We disagree. Re-litigating the same issue would pose a substantial burden: not only would it require another trial, but it would also necessitate the unearthing of evidence, witnesses (who are victims of sexual assaults), and materials pertaining to identification processes that took place over 20 years ago.”
Lack of Discovery
Paez aso maintained that Vargas was prejudiced by Wilson dismissing his claim before he had a chance to conduct discovery on the identification issue. He said in a footnote:
“Discovery in a § 1983 lawsuit can sometimes reveal how a wrongful conviction occurred.”
VanDyke countered:
“While Vargas asserts he was prejudiced by the inability to obtain discovery in this lawsuit, he fails to point to any new relevant evidence that he could now obtain through discovery that he was barred from obtaining in his criminal case. Thus, the only prejudice collateral estoppel caused to Vargas is the same prejudice every litigant experiences from collateral estoppel: he doesn’t get another bite at the apple. But neither Vargas nor the dissent can explain how this bite would produce materially different results than the previous discovery opportunities afforded to Vargas.”
Public Perception
The dissenter asserted that if the District Court were to reach a conclusion differing from that of the Superior Court, it would not lessen public confidence in the judicial system, remarking:
“In my view, we do not preserve judicial integrity by preventing litigation that seeks to identify the causes and circumstances of a serious miscarriage of justice, like the one Vargas suffered.”
Relitigation under the circumstances, he contended, would not constitute condonation of vexatious litigation and barring that relitigation would not serve the interests of justice.
VanDyke presented this view:
“Ultimately, the dissent’s collateral estoppel analysis makes the same mistake that infects Vargas’s arguments—that is, assuming that the later vacatur of Vargas’s conviction based on recent DNA evidence must somehow be relevant to the identification procedures. It is not. The fact that other later-discovered evidence now supports the conclusion that Vargas did not commit the crimes says nothing about whether the identification procedures themselves were problematic. Completely proper identification procedures may still result in an incorrect identification. Beyond mere speculation. Vargas has provided no indication that there was something improper about the identification procedures in this case that he did not already have the opportunity to pursue in his prior criminnal case.”
The case is Vargas v. City of Los Angeles, 19-55967.
In 2016, the Los Angeles Superior Court declared Vargas to have been factually innocent, and in 2017, the state awarded him $886,760 in compensation.
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